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Studies of damaged human brains have always intrigued 
neuroscientists. The rich symptomatology that can result 
is riveting to all who experience examination of such pa- 
tients. Yet, one of the concerns of basic scientists is that 
structure-function correlates are difficult to make in the 
damaged brain, since the lesions are naturally occurring 
and usually quite diffuse. In addition to the problem of 
quantitating the lesion, there has always been concern 
whether the information gained about the brain in the pres- 
ence of lesions is all that useful in understanding normal 
brain mechanisms. Are observed effects due to the dam- 
age of specific areas or to distant effects? These and other 
issues have limited the general acceptance of the findings 
from clinical studies. 
One of the immediate appeals of the study of patients 
with surgical division of the forebrain is that the separate 
functions of the two cerebral hemispheres can be studied 
readily in the absence of focal damage. Also, the callosal 
surgery, while producing damage to the brain, was dis- 
crete damage to a fiber system and not to nuclear areas. 
In 1961, R. W. Sperry and his colleagues commenced a 
series of studies on patients who had undergone surgical 
section of the cerebral commissures in an effort to control 
their otherwise intractable epilepsy (Bogen et al., 1965). 
Studies continue on the original patients as well as others 
and still shed light on the nature of both cortical and sub- 
cortical neural networks. In what follows, I review some 
aspects of this work to illustrate how this initial work has 
progressed from the early sixties until the time of Sperry's 
death in the spring of 1994. 
Patients who undergo so-called split-brain surgery all 
suffer from intractable pilepsy. Prior to their surgery, ex- 
tensive attempts are made to control their seizures medi- 
cally. Failure to do so, along with other clinical criteria, 
finds them candidates for surgical division of the corpus 
callosum, and in some cases the anterior commissure as 
well. Although these patients are not normal, the onset of 
their epilepsy varies and has different etiologies. It has 
not been possible to correlate any of these variations in 
their neurologic history with the pattern of results obtained 
from the cognitive studies. It is known from other data that, 
in order for there to be significant changes in the normal 
patterns of cerebral lateralization, a large lesion must oc- 
cur to one side of the brain in early childhood (Rasmussen 
and Milner, 1977). 
In the original studies on the California series of patients, 
it was necessary to rely on surgical notes for determination 
of the completeness of the surgical sections. In more re- 
cent years, both magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and 
other electrical brain mapping techniques have provided a 
more accurate representation of the extent of the surgical 
sections. Accu rate documentation of the extent of callosal 
section becomes crucial for understanding the organiza- 
tion of the cerebral commissure. 
The main methods of testing the perceptual and cogni- 
tive functions of each hemisphere have not changed in 
principle over the years. However, there have been signifi- 
cant advances in the technologies used to present stimuli 
to the surgically separated hemispheres. In the early 
years, information was visually lateralized to one or the 
other hemispheres by quickly flashing stimuli to one or 
the other visual field using electronic shutters attached to 
slide projectors (see Figure 1). As the patient fixates on 
a point in space, information flashed to the left of fixation 
is presented exclusively to the right hemisphere. The quick 
flashing is necessary to control for unwanted eye move- 
ments, which would redirect the information into the un- 
wanted hemisphere. This method has been replaced by 
using computer-based stimuli presentation arrangements. 
More importantly, the development of an image stabilizing 
system, used in concert with a Purkinje eye tracker, now 
permits sustained presentation of information to either vi- 
sual field, and therefore, either hemisphere. Accordingly, 
if a subject moves his or her eyes away from fixation, the 
stabilizing system moves the stimulus with the eyes and 
thereby prevents the information from being presented to 
the wrong hemisphere. This technological development 
has allowed for new findings on both the neurological and 
psychological aspects of hemisphere disconnection. 
Fundamental Principles Arising from Initial Studies 
The original reports on the California series of patients 
dealt with a number of fundamental issues concerning the 
basic psychological properties of the separated cerebral 
hemispheres, as well as basic issues of neurological orga- 
nization (Sperry et al., 1969; Gazzaniga, 1970). In many 
respects, the issues raised in the original studies still drive 
current research efforts. In the following, the neurologic 
consequences will be reviewed first, followed by the stud- 
ies on the separate psychological properties of the two 
cerebral hemispheres. 
Sensory and Motor Studies 
The human studies were carried out in the context of 
strong new animal evidence, obtained by Myers and 
Sperry (1958), that dividing the cerebral commissures pro- 
duced a profound deficit in the interhemispheric transfer 
of sensory and motor information. In the cat, monkey, and 
chimpanzee, Myers (1956) had determined that, following 
midline section of the corpus callosum and anterior com- 
missure, visual and tactile information lateralized to one 
hemisphere did not transfer to the opposite hemisphere. 
This resulted in the so-called "split-brain" animal. This star- 
tling discovery was completely contrary to earlier reports 
on the effects of human commissure section reported by 
Akelaitis (1941, 1944). Akelaitis reported no significant 
neurological or psychological effects following section of 
the callosum. 
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Figure 1. Stimulus Lateralization Technique 
To examine differentially hemispheric processing differences, itis nec- 
essary to lateralize stimuli within the left and right visual fields (upper 
left). However, if the subject makes an eye movement during the stimu- 
lus presentation, proper lateralization is no longer maintained (upper 
middle). Thus, retinal stabilization is useful to counteract the effects 
of such eye movements (upper ight). A dual Purkinje image eyetracker 
coupled with a mirror stimulus deflector allows uch retinal stabilization 
(lower left). As eye movements occur, horizontal nd vertical deflection 
mirrors move to counteract such movements, maintaining proper later- 
alization (lower ight). 
The surgeries on the original California cases (W J, NG, 
and LB) were able to show that humans responded to 
forebrain commissurotomy in essentially the same way as 
the monkey and chimpanzee. Visual information pre- 
sented to one half-brain was not available to the other 
half-brain for analysis. A similar principle applies to touch. 
Objects placed in the right hand were normally named 
and described, but objects presented in the left hand were 
not. Similarly, sensory information presented to one hemi- 
sphere was useful in guiding the contralateral hand but 
very ineffective in controlling the ipsilateral hand. 
From a cognitive point of view, the first studies confirmed 
long-standing neurologic knowledge about the nature of 
the two cerebral hemispheres. The left brain was dominant 
for language, speech, and major problem solving, while 
the right appeared specialized for visuospatial tasks such 
as drawing cubes and other three-dimensional patterns. 
Of course, this meant that visual and tactile stimuli pre- 
sented to the right hemisphere could not be named or 
described, since the sensory information was discon- 
nected from the dominant left speech hemisphere. This 
dramatic result stood in contrast to the right hemisphere's 
ability to acknowledge the presence of these stimuli by 
allowing it to respond in a nonverbal manner, such as 
pointing to matching objects and the like. 
In the subsequent 30 years, these studies have been 
followed up by a nu mber of investigators. While the original 
studies set the framework for subsequent research, the 
huge effort to characterize fully these unique human be- 
ings has continued to yield major insights into the organi- 
zation of the human brain. 
Perceptual and Attentional Studies Following 
Cerebral Disconnection 
The attentional and perceptual abilities of split-brain pa- 
tients have been extensively explored. Visual perception 
is the easiest to study. Overall, following cortical discon- 
nection, perceptual information does not interact between 
the two cerebral hemispheres, whereas the supporting 
cognitive processes of attentional mechanisms do some- 
times interact. 
Simple Perceptual Interactions Are Not Seen 
Split-brain patients are not able to cross-integrate visual 
information between their two visual half-fields. When vi- 
sual information is lateralized to either the left or right dis- 
connected hemisphere, the unstimulated hemisphere 
cannot use the information for perceptual analysis (see 
Figure 2). This is also true for stereognostic information 
presented to each hand. While the presence or absence 
of touch stimulation is noted to any part of the body by 
either hemisphere, patterned somatosensory information 
is lateralized. Thus, an object held in the left hand cannot 
help the right hand find an identical object. Although there 
have been reports arguing that some higher order percep- 
tual information is integrated at some level via subcortical 
structures (Cronin-Golomb, 1986; Sergent, 1990), these 
results have not been replicated by others (Seymour et 
al., 1994; Corballis et al., 1993; Corballis, 1994; McKeever 
et al., 1981). 
Humans Show Visual Midline 
Overlap Phenomenon 
There is some nasotemporal overlap at the retinal vertical 
meridian in cat and monkey (Stone, t966; Stone et al., 
1973). In a stripe 1-2 degrees of visual angle wide that 
straddles the two visual half-fields, visual information is 
sent to both the left and right visual cortices. Whether or 
not the anatomical projections have any functional signifi- 
cance has never been examined in the animal. Fendrich et 
al. (1989) have examined this issue in split-brain patients. 
Using an image stabilizer combined with a Purkinje eye 
tracker, careful assessment of the visual midline of two 
split-brain patients has revealed an area of no more than 
2 degrees in width at the vertical midline where visual 
information appears available to each half-brain. This con- 
trasts with the findings of Sugishita et al. (1994), who found 
no overlap but who were disadvantaged by not having the 
image stabilizer to carry out their midline studies. Still, 
within this strip of overlap, the signals conveyed to each 
hemisphere from the contralateral hemiretina appear to 
be weak or degraded. Stimuli could not be compared 
across the vertical meridian if these comparison required 
detailed shape information, or if the stimuli were presented 
for only 200 ms. 
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Figure 2. Interhemispheric Transfer Tests 
The upper example depicts patial tests. On within-field trials (A), the 
eyes moved to the stimulus that was surrounded by the probe. On 
between-field trials (B), the eyes also moved to the corresponding 
stimulus in the other hemifield. In contrast, when perceptual informa- 
tion was used as the cue (lower examples), the capacity to find the 
patterned cue was only possible on the within-field trials (A). On the 
between-field trials (B), the response to the opposite field was only at 
chance. 
Interhemispheric Transfer Is Seen for Crude 
Spatial Location Information 
Unlike visual and somatosensory cues, crude information 
concerning spatial locations can be cross-integrated 
(Trevarthen, 1968; Trevarthen and Sperry, 1973; Holtz- 
man, 1984). In one set of experiments, a four-point grid 
was presented to each visual field. On a given trial, one 
of the positions on the grid was highlighted, and one con- 
dition of the task required the subject to move his eyes 
to the highlighted point within the visual field stimulated. 
In the second condition, the subject was required to 
move the eyes to the relative point in the opposite visual 
field. Split-brain subjects were easily able to do this, 
thereby suggesting some crude cross-integration of spa- 
tial information. This was true even if the grid was randomly 
positioned in the tested field. 
Spatial Attention Can Be Directed but Not Divided 
between the Hemispheres 
The finding that some type of spatial information remains 
integrated between the two half-brains raises the question 
of whether the attentional processes associated with spa- 
tial information are affected by cortical disconnection sur- 
gery. Using a modification of a paradigm developed by 
Posner et al. (1980) that capitalizes on spatial priming phe- 
nomena, Holtzman et al. (1981) found that either hemi- 
sphere can direct attention to a point in either the left or 
right visual field. Posner first showed that the response 
latency to a peripheral visual target is reduced when ob- 
servers have prior information regarding its spatial locus, 
even when eye movements are prevented. Presumably, 
the spatial cue allows observers to direct their attention 
to the appropriate location prior to the onset of the target. 
When this paradigm was used in split-brain patients to 
measure the extent to which such attentional cues affect 
performance, the separated hemispheres were found not 
to be strictly independent in their control of spatial orienta- 
tion. Rather, the two hemispheres rely on a common ori- 
enting system to maintain a single focus of attention. Thus, 
as with normal people, a cue to direct attention to a particu- 
lar point in the visual field is used no matter which hemi- 
sphere is presented with the spatial cue. 
The discovery that spatial attention could be directed 
with ease to either visual field raised the question of 
whether each separate cognitive system in the split-brain 
patient could, if instructed to do so, independently direct 
attention to a particular part of its own visual field (Holtz- 
man et al., 1984). Can the right hemisphere direct attention 
to a point in the left visual field while the left brain simulta- 
neously directs attention to a point in the right visual field? 
Normal subjects cannot so divide their attention. Can split- 
brain patients with evident cognition in both hemispheres 
do so? 
Results from several studies show that the split-brain 
patient is unable to divide spatial attention between the two 
half-brains. There would appear to be only one integrated 
spatial attention system that remains intact following corti- 
cal disconnection. Thus, like neurologically intact observ- 
ers, the attentional system of split-brain patients is unifo- 
cal. They are unable to prepare for events in two spatially 
disparate locations. 
Attentional Resources Are Shared 
The dramatic effects of disconnecting the cerebral hemi- 
spheres on perception and cognition might suggest each 
half-brain possessed its own attentional resources. If true, 
one would predict the cognitive operations of one half- 
brain, no matter what the difficulty, would little influence 
the cognitive activities of the other. The competing view 
is that the brain has a set of limited resources that manage 
such processes, and if they are being applied to task A, 
there are fewer available for task B. This model would 
predict that the harder hemisphere A worked on a task, 
the worse hemisphere B would do on a task of constant 
complexity. 
Many studies have been carried out on this issue, and 
all confirm the notion that the central resources are limited 
(Holtzman and Gazzaniga, 1982). In the original experi- 
ment, there were two conditions. In what was called the 
"mixed" or hard condition, two series of three different geo- 
metric shapes were displayed concurrently to the left and 
right of central fixation and thus were lateralized to the 
right and left hem ispheres, respectively. In the"redundant" 
or easy condition, the series of three different geometric 
shapes was presented to only one hemisphere, while the 
other viewed three identical geometric shapes. A unilateral 
probe figure subsequently appeared, and the observer in- 
dicated with a forced-choice key press whether it matched 
any of the probed field's items. The results clearly showed 
that, when one half-brain was working on processing only 
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one repeated stimulus, the opposite hemisphere per- 
formed better at recalling whether the probed stimulus 
was part of the original set of three stimuli. When both 
hemispheres were trying to process three stimuli, the per- 
formance of each was impaired. These overall findings 
have recently been replicated in a monkey model of these 
tasks (Lewine et al., 1994). 
The foregoing concept of resources as used here is to 
be distinguished from other properties of sensory systems 
associated with attentional information processing. The 
limit on the processing of information that is captured by 
the concept of resource limitations in cuing tasks or pro- 
cessing load tasks is more general and distinct from the 
limits and mechanisms now studied in such phenomena 
as searching a visual scene for information. The concept of 
resources, as conceptualized from the results in split-brain 
patients, largely refers to processes that are engaged 
when there is a voluntary allocation of attention to an infor- 
mation processing task. Searching a visual scene, how- 
ever, calls upon more automatic processes that may well 
be built- in properties of the visual system itself (Olshausen 
et al., 1993). That these systems are distinct is reflected in 
the results of the following studies, in which it is discovered 
that splitting the brain has a different effect on such pro- 
cesses. 
Visual Search Is Independent and Different 
in the Half.Brains 
The more items presented to be analyzed in a visual array, 
the longer it takes to search the array for the information 
being sought in a particular task (Sternberg, 1975). Thus, 
after a baseline reaction time is established, it takes nor- 
mal controls an additional 70 ms to detect a target if there 
are two more items, another 70 ms for an additional two 
items, and so on. This linear increase in response time 
with numbers of elements in a display is characteristic 
only of "conjunction search," i.e., where targets cannot be 
distinguished from nontargets by a simple featural differ- 
ence. In split-brain patients, it has been shown that, when 
the items are distributed across the midline of the visual 
field as opposed to all being in one visual field, the reaction 
time to added stimuli s cut almost in half (Luck et al., 1989, 
1994). These results indicate that the two disconnected 
hemispheres can search the arrays in parallel, something 
that normal subjects cannot do. 
This finding has recently been extended by Kingstone 
et al. (1995) to show that, although the overall resources 
a brain commits to a task appear constant, the strategy 
by which they are used can vary as a function of the hemi- 
sphere activated for the task. It now appears the fixed 
properties seen in visual search experiments can be influ- 
enced by what are called "top-down" properties. In this 
study it was discovered that the strategy by which each 
hemisphere carried out the examination of the contents 
of its visual field differed. The left, dominant hemisphere 
utilized a "guided" or "smart" strategy, whereas the right 
hemisphere did not. This means the left hemisphere 
adopted a helpful cognitive strategy in solving the prob- 
lem, while the right hemisphere does not possess those 
kinds of extra cognitive skills to assist its visual search 
mechanism. 
Sensorimotor Control Mechanisms Differ 
for Eye and Hand 
With the remarkable separation of sensory information 
and with the well known lateralization of corticospinal mo- 
tor systems, the split-brain animal and human raise inter- 
esting questions concerning the neural mechanism by 
which a motor activity can take place. In recent years, 
these patients have also offered the opportunity to test 
theories about the nature of the neural pathways active 
in visuo-ocular control. 
A Disconnected Hemisphere Can Control Both 
Arms but Only the Opposite Hand 
One of the enduring findings of split-brain research has 
been the distinction between the capacity a disconnected 
hemisphere has for controlling proximal versus distal mus- 
cles. Sectioning of the callosum clearly impairs the capac- 
ity of the left hemisphere to control the left hand and of 
the right hemisphere to control the right hand. These ipsi- 
lateral sensorimotor combinations need the intact callo- 
sum to integrate information from the cortical sensory 
areas to the motor cortex that controls distal hand move- 
ment. At the same time, either hemisphere can guide and 
control more proximal movements of each arm, and of 
course, the legs. This ability of each separated hemi- 
sphere to control each arm allows for the appearance of 
centrally integrated information when, in fact, the integra- 
tion seen is somatic and peripheral. 
In a recent study by Kingstone et al. (1995), it was shown 
that a task which appeared to involve the central integra- 
tion of information in fact reflected only the peripheral inte- 
gration of information. In these experiments, one word was 
flashed to one hemisphere and another to the opposite 
hemisphere. The task required the patient o draw what the 
message said; i.e., for words such as "bow" and "arrow," 
where "bow" was flashed to the right hemisphere and 
"arrow" was flashed to the left hemisphere, the subject 
would draw a bow with an arrow in position. At first glance 
this appears to suggest the information presented to each 
half-brain was somehow integrated through subcortical 
systems that in turned managed the motor response. How- 
ever, the real strategy was unearthed when word pairs 
were presented that, if truly integrated, would result in one 
kind of drawing versus another. In these trials, the word 
pair "hot-dog" was presented, where "hot" was flashed to 
the right hemisphere and "dog" was flashed to the left 
hemisphere. In this case the subject drew a picture of a 
dog and then added lines indicating it was panting from 
heat. If, of course, the entire word had been flashed to one 
or the other hemisphere, the subject would have drawn a 
hot dog, which is to say a frankfurter in a bun. Thus, what 
might appear to be centrally integrated sensorimotor re- 
sponse was in fact a case in which each hemisphere con- 
trolled and released the arm used in drawing in an ef- 
fortless and efficient manner. 
Either Hemisphere Can Control Saccadic 
Eye Movements 
In contrast to the inability of a disconnected hemisphere 
to control the ipsilateral hand with accuracy, each hemi- 
sphere is able to direct the eyes either contraversively or 
ipsiversively (Hughes et al., 1992). This capacity would 
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Figure 3. Postoperative Mid-Saggital MR Images 
Magnetic resonance images (MRIs) of four patients with varying degrees of callosal section. 
(A) The entire corpus callosum has been sectioned, resulting  no transfer of information between the cerebral hemispheres. 
(B) The posterior or splenia! regions have some sparing i  a particular area, with the result that visual information could be transferred between 
the cerebral hemispheres. 
(C) The posterior callosum was sectioned, while the anterior half remained intact. This patient had difficulty with sensorimotor integration of one
hand but not the other. 
(D) Two remnants were inadvertently left intact, one in the splenial region a d one in anterior genu region (see Gazzaniga, 1989). 
not be predicted by dozens of studies showing that in each 
hemisphere the frontal eye fields control contraversive ye 
movements (Bruce and Goldberg, 1984; Wurtz and AI- 
bane, 1980). This particular result reveals how psycho- 
physical studies on human patients with discrete lesions 
suggest that alternate neural pathways are involved, path- 
ways different from those that might otherwise be evident 
from the animal studies. 
The foregoing group of studies reveals how discon- 
necting the cerebral hemispheres at the cortical level inter- 
rupts some kinds of attentional, perceptual, and sensori- 
motor processes, but not others. Although there is little 
evidence that any perceptual information can be trans- 
ferred between the hemispheres, there are some kinds of 
attentional and sensorimotor processes that remain un- 
changed with cortical disconnection. Just as formal genet- 
ics helps formulate the concept of a gene that later be- 
comes understood at the molecular level, identifying these 
differences in brain organization will help neuroscientists 
understand the systems basis of these mental activities. 
Partial Callosal Sections Reveal Specificity 
of Commissure Function 
In animal studies, it was quickly determined that sectioning 
the entire corpus callosum and anterior commissure pre- 
vented the interhemispheric transfer of a wide range of 
modal and motor information. Itwas also shown that partial 
sectioning of the commissures could block specific func- 
tions from transferring across the callosum (Black and My- 
ers, 1966; Sullivan and Hamilton, 1973; Hamilton and Ver- 
meire, 1986). In humans, it was only after other cases 
appeared who had not undergone full callosal section that 
comparable studies could be done, and it became appar- 
ent that specific regions of the callosum were responsible 
for the transfer of specific modalities. This work was en- 
hanced when MRI allowed for the accurate description of 
cut and uncut fiber systems. 
MRI.Verified Lesions of Partial Sections Reveal 
Specific Modal Functions 
When the corpus callosum is fully sectioned, there is little 
or no perceptual or cognitive interaction between the hemi- 
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Figure 4. Visual Transfer Fallowing Staged Callosal Section 
Case JW underwent a staged callosal section in which the posterior 
half of the callosum was first sectioned. It has been shown that the 
posterior disconnecting surgery prevents the transfer of information 
related to the sensory dimensions of the stimulus, but not he semantic. 
The result was consistent with the overall knowledge that more anterior 
regions of the callosum are committed to the transfer of higher order 
information (from Sidtis, 1981). 
spheres. Surgical cases in which callosal section was ei- 
ther limited or where there was inadvertent sparing of a 
part of the callosum allow for the examination of specific 
functions of the caUosum by region. For example, when 
the splenial region (posterior area of the callosum that 
interconnects the occipital obe) is spared, there is normal 
transfer of visual information between the two cerebral 
hemispheres (Figure 3). In these cases, pattern, color, and 
linguistic information presented anywhere in either visual 
field can be matched with information presented to the 
other half-brain. However, such patients how no transfer 
of stereognostic information and also show a left ear sup- 
pression to dichotically presented auditory stimuli. These 
kind of observations are consistent with other human and 
animal data that show the major subdivisions of the calla- 
sum are organized into functional zones, with the posterior 
regions more concerned with visual information and the 
more anterior egions transferring auditory and tactile in- 
formation (Hamilton, 1982; Gaz.zaniga, 1989). 
Anterior Callosum Is Involved in Higher Order 
Transfer of Semantic Information 
Patients who have undergone staged callosal section 
have also provided glimpses into what anterior callosal 
regions are involved in transferring between the cerebral 
hemispheres. When the posterior half of the callosum is 
sectioned, transfer of visual, tactile, and auditory sensory 
information is severely disrupted. However, the remaining 
intact anterior callosum is able to transfer higher order 
information (Figure 4). Higher order information is a term 
used when it is clear the information transferred is not 
simply sensory in nature. This distinction was shown in 
one study (Sidtis et al., 1981) in which the corpus callosum 
was sectioned in two stages. Following the first stage of 
sectioning, the patient was unable to name stimuli pre- 
sented to the right hemisphere. However, over a 10 week 
period, he gradually began to name some of the stimuli. 
Close examination of this capacity revealed that the right 
hemisphere was transmitting to the left hemisphere higher 
order or gnostic cues about the stimulus, but not the actual 
stimulus itself (Figure 4). In short, the anterior callosum 
transfers gnostic representations of the stimulus, but not 
the stimulus itself. Following section of the anterior calla- 
sum, this behavior ceased. 
Memory Studies Following Cerebral Disconnection 
The most powerful impression one has observing patients 
who have had their hemispheres divided is how unaffected 
they appear to be in terms of their general cognitive aware- 
ness, affect, and sense of self (Gazzaniga, 1970). At a 
superficial level of observation, separating half of the neo- 
cortex from the other half appears to have little impact on 
overall cognition. Verbal IQ remains intact, as do within- 
hemisphere reaction times to perceptual stimuli and gen- 
eral problem solving capacities. On the other hand, stan- 
dardized memory tests administered postoperatively have 
suggested that there is an impairment in short-term mem- 
ory capacity (Zaidel and Sperry, 1974). Recent studies 
have extended these observations. 
Free Recall but Not Recognition Memory Is 
Impaired in Each Cerebral Hemisphere 
We have recently carried out a variety of studies on overall 
information processing capacities and, in some instances, 
have been able to compare postoperative performance 
with preoperative capacity. In these new tests, an interest- 
ing picture emerges that suggests commissurotomy im- 
pacts on free recall mechanisms but that recognition mem- 
ory remains largely unchanged. Free recall requires a 
subject, with no cuing, to recall prior information such as 
a previously studied word list. Recognition tasks merely 
require a subject to judge whether a stimulus such as a 
printed word has been seen before on a previously studied 
list. The overall pattern of results is consistent with the 
idea that disconnecting the hemispheres has a powerful 
effect on free recall capacity, while recognition capacity 
remains normal (Phelps et al., 1991). Moreover, it was 
shown that only posterior callosal-sectioned patients re- 
vealed the free recall deficit. Anterior callosum-sectioned 
patients behaved normally. Since sectioning the posterior 
callosum inevitably involves sectioning the hippocampal 
commissure, it is suggested this structure may play a cru- 
cial role in this specific memory deficit. This would be con- 
sistent with studies suggesting even unilateral hippocam- 
pal damage can produce probems in free recall (Goldstein 
and Polkey, 1992; Ott and Saver, 1993). Disconnection 
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Figure 5. Memory Performance Following Callosal Section 
On each "redundant" rial (top left), a bilaterally displayed target (X) 
moved among four homologous cells in the two matrices. A tone 
sounded and a unilateral probe sequence was presented. The ob- 
server indicated whether the probe sequence matched the probed 
field's target sequence. In this example, the bilateral target sequences 
began at time T~ in the upper left corners of the two matrices and 
concluded at -14 in the upper right corners, and the unilateral probe 
sequence was presented from Ts-Ts. All Xs appeared for 150 ms. The 
diagram on the right is an example of a mixed condition trial. Mixed 
conditions trials differed from redundant condition trials only in that 
different target sequences were presented in the two visual fields. 
Data are presented separately for commissurotomy patient JW and 
the average performance ofthe control observers (after Holtzman and 
Gazzaniga, 1985). 
of the hemispheres in this commissural zone might well 
mimic the unilateral esion effects. Overall, the data sug- 
gest that the intact neocortical systems that are intercon- 
nected through the posterior callosal system contribute to 
free recall mechanisms. It is as if the neural mechanisms 
required for richly encoding a stimulus, which contribute to 
free recall, are less available to each hemisphere following 
posterior cortical disconnection. 
Increase in Short-Term Memory Capacity Is More 
Apparent Than Real 
Although the data suggest there are difficulties in free re- 
call, the cortically disconnected patient can perform other 
memory tests in a manner superior to that of a normal. 
Consider the following. 
As already reviewed, the callosum-sectioned patient 
has no measurable interactions between the two hemi- 
spheres in the processing of perceptual information. Iden- 
tical and simple visual patterns of all kinds can be pre- 
sented to each separate half-brain, and the patient is 
unable to say whether the stimuli are the same or different. 
This fact raises the possibility that, in a memory task involv- 
ing visual retention, a split-brain subject might perform at 
a higher level than a normal intact control subject if the 
perceptual information were distributed between the two 
visual half-fields. In one study on this issue, a complex 
spatial memory task was administered to both a split-brain 
patient and normal controls in which critical information 
was presented in each visual half.field (Holtzman and Gaz- 
zaniga, 1985). For the controls, the visual information was 
automatically combined and perceived as one large prob- 
lem (Figure 5). For the split-brain patient, each hemisphere 
perceived a problem that remained separate from the per- 
ceptual information presented to the other half-brain; thus, 
each hemisphere perceived a much simpler task. The re- 
sults were clear. The split-brain patient out-performed the 
normal controls on critical test conditions. The callosum- 
sectioned patient benefited from the fact that the percep- 
tual array under one of the test conditions did not appear 
more difficult because the work was distributed to each 
separate hemisphere, even though the actual sensory 
array was identical to that experienced by the intact normal 
controls. 
Disconnection of the cerebral hemispheres clearly 
allows for a unique cognitive state. In a sense it turns a 
serial, unified perceptual system into two simpler percep- 
tual systems that do not interact, and therefore do not 
interfere with each other. It allows for the breaking down of 
a large perceptual problem into smaller, more manageable 
problems that a half-brain is capable of solving. From the 
observer's point of view, however, it looks like the total 
information processing capacity of the patient has been 
increased and is superior to that of normal controls. Yet, 
as we saw in the studies on attention already described, 
close inspection of the problem indicates split-brain pa- 
tients have not increased the amount of resources they 
can call upon to solve problems. In short, it appears that 
the human brain has a set amount of resources it can 
allocate to cognitive tasks and that these resources remain 
constant following commissurotomy. How then do we ex- 
plain these two seemingly different sets of results? On the 
one hand, performance seems better than normal, while 
on the other hand we have seen there are resource limits 
for perceptual and cognitive tasks. 
The conundrum forces the issue of where in a percep- 
tual motor task resource limitations are applied. Are they, 
for example, applied during the early phases of information 
processing that deal with the complexity of the visual stim- 
ulus itself? Or, are the resources applied at later loci of 
the information processing sequence that deal with the 
more cognitive aspects of the task? It would appear that 
interactions between the hemispheres on resource limits 
occur when the task is more cognitive and involves work- 
ing memory. Lewine et al. (1994) have proposed a similar 
scheme and suggest the site of subcortical interaction may 
be the brain stem. 
Language and Speech Processes of the Left 
and Right Hemispheres 
A dichotomy that is useful when trying to understand lan- 
guage is the distinction between how the brain enables 
grammar and how it enables a lexicon. The grammar- 
lexicon distinction (Pinker, t 993) is different from the more 
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traditional syntax-semantic distinction that is commonly 
invoked to understand the differential effects of brain le- 
sions on language processes. In general terms, grammar 
refers to the rule-based system humans have for ordering 
words to allow for effective communication. The lexicon, 
on the other hand, is the mind's dictionary, where specific 
words are associated with particular meanings. The rea- 
son for using the former distinction is that it takes into 
account such factors as memory, in that with memory such 
word strings as idioms can be learned by rote. While it is 
clearly the case that the lexicon (memory) cannot underlie 
most phrases and sentences, since there are endless 
unique sentences such as the one I am currently writing, 
memory does play a role in many short phrases. Thus, 
when uttered, such word strings do not reflect an underly- 
ing interaction of syntax and semantic systems. They are, 
instead, essentially an entry from the lexicon. In more gen- 
eral terms, a modern view would predict there ought to 
be brain areas wholly responsible for grammar, while evi- 
dence for localization of the lexicon ought to be more elu- 
sive, since it would reflect learned information and thus 
be part of the general memory/knowledge systems of the 
brain. The grammar system ought to be discrete and there- 
fore localizable. The lexicon should be distributed and 
therefore more difficult to damage completely. 
Language and Speech Processes Can Rarely Be 
Present in Both Hemispheres: Right Hemisphere 
Language Has a Different Organizational 
Structure Than Left 
While the separated left hemisphere is fully capable of 
normal comprehension of all aspects of language, the right 
hemisphere can possess language. When there was evi- 
dence of right hemisphere language, these disconnected 
right hemispheres were severely limited in the kinds of 
linguistic properties they possessed (Gazzaniga, 1970; 
Zaidel, 1990). 
Over the last 30 years, very few cases have been added 
to the group that demonstrate some kind of language in 
the right hemisphere (reviewed in Baynes, 1990). In the 
early eighties, only five cases in all series of split-brain 
patients had proven to have a lexicon in the right hemi- 
sphere. Since that time we have been successful in finding 
only one more normally right-handed patient with a lexicon 
in both the left and the right hemispheres (Baynes et al., 
1992). 
The left and the right lexicons of these special patients 
can be nearly equal in their capacity, but they are orga- 
nized quite differently. For example, both hemispheres 
show a phenomenon called the "word superiority effect" 
(WSE). Normal readers are able to identify letters better 
when they occur in the context of real English words, rather 
than when the same letters occur in pseudo-word (korad) 
or nonword (twhx) strings. Since pseudo- and nonwords 
do not have lexical entries, letters occurring in such strings 
do not receive the additional processing benefit bestowed 
on words, and thus the WSE emerges. By this view, the 
WSE may be a useful measure of the integrity of the visual 
lexicon. When the appropriate studies assessing these 
effects were carried out with each hemisphere, it was ap- 
parent each hemisphere in these special patients has a 
visual lexicon that provides an advantage for recognizing 
letters that occur in real words. At the same time, a closer 
analysis of the data revealed each hemisphere was using 
a different strategy in processing the words. Examination 
of the reaction time data, for example, suggested that the 
right hemisphere took more time to respond as the words 
became longer. The left hemisphere did not, just as is 
the case for normal readers. In addition, in the WSE task 
described above, the error data revealed a different pat- 
tern for each hemisphere. The left hemisphere made more 
errors on the middle letters of words, just as in controls, 
while the right hemisphere made more errors on the last 
letters of words. Finally, achieving similar levels of accu- 
racy in each hemisphere required exposure durations al- 
most 10 times as long in the nondominant hemispheres. 
This result suggests letter processing for the right hemi- 
sphere is serial and not parallel in nature, as is normally 
the case (Reuter-Lorenz and Baynes, 1992). 
To locate where in the processing chain the hemisphere 
differences begin, we evaluated each hemisphere's per- 
formance on a letter priming task. The task was simply to 
indicate whether a briefly flashed upper case letter was 
an "H" or a "T." On each trial the upper case letter was 
preceded by a lower case letter that was either an "h" or 
a "t." Normally, subjects are significantly faster when an 
upper case"H" is preceded by a lower case "h," rather than 
a lower case "t." This is a version of the classic "priming" 
phenomenon frequently used in cognitive science to get 
at mechanisms of mental processes. When using letters 
instead of words in a priming task, it is assumed very early 
stages in the perceptual-cognitive continuum are being 
examined. 
The difference between response latency on compatible 
(h-H) versus incompatible (t-H) trials is taken to be a mea- 
sure of letter priming. JW performed a lateralized version 
of this task in which the prime was exposed for 100 ms 
to either the right or left visual field, and 400 ms later, the 
target letter appeared in either the right or left visual field. 
His performance provides no evidence of letter priming 
for left visual field trials, but clear evidence of priming for 
right visual field trials. Thus, there are no priming phenom- 
ena in the disconnected right hemisphere. In summary, 
there can be two lexicons, one in each hemisphere, but 
this lexical organization is rare. When present, the right 
hemisphere lexicon seems to be organized differently than 
the lexicon of the left hemisphere. These observations 
would be consistent with the view that lexicons reflect 
learning processes and as such would have a wider distri- 
bution in the cerebral cortex. Still, it would be folly not to 
note that in the general population the lexicon seems to 
be in the left hemisphere. A right hemisphere lexicon is 
rarely present, and when it is, it stores information differently. 
Generative Syntax Is Present 
in Only One Hemisphere 
While the right hemispheres of some patients clearly have 
lexicons, these right hemispheres have shown erratic per- 
formance on other aspects of language such as under- 
standing verbs, pluralizations, the possessive, active/ 
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passive differences, etc. (Gazzaniga, 1970). The right 
hemisphere in the patients that possess some language 
also lacks a capacity to use word order to disambiguate 
stimuli for correct grammatical meaning. Nonetheless, 
these right hemispheres can indicate when a sentence 
ends with a semantically odd word (Kutas et al., 1988). 
Additionally, right hemispheres that reveal language ca- 
pacities are able to make judgments of grammaticality 
(Baynes and Gazzaniga, 1988; Baynes, 1990). Thus, even 
though they cannot use syntax to disambiguate stimuli or 
to guide comprehension judgments, they can recognize 
that one set of utterances is grammatical while another 
is not. This finding suggests that patterns of speech are 
learned by rote. Yet, recognizing the pattern of acceptable 
utterances does not mean a neural system can use this 
information to assist in the understanding of word strings• 
Some Right Hemispheres Can Develop Speech 
One of the hallmarks of most split-brain patients is that 
they speak out of the left hemisphere and not the right. 
This observation has been consistent with the neurologic 
literature and amytal studies which have shown that the 
left hemisphere is the dominant hemisphere for both lan- 
guage and speech (Lennenberg, 1967). 
There are now three and possibly four split-brain pa- 
tients who seem able to speak out of each hemisphere. 
While there is always an initially dominant hemisphere 
following brain bisection, some patients have developed 
the capacity to make one word utterances from the discon- 
nected right hemisphere (Gazzaniga et al., 1979). In these 
experiments, it became apparent that stimuli presented to 
the left visual field (right hemisphere) began to be named. 
Ordinarily, one stimulus presented to the left hemisphere 
could be named. This rather startling development raised 
the question of whether the information was somehow 
transferring to the dominant hemisphere for speech out- 
put, or whether the right hemisphere itself had developed 
speech= After a series of tests, it was apparent that the 
latter option was correct. The patients, for example, while 
able to name an object presented in the left field, in the 
right field could not judge if they were the same objects 
or not. Or, if words like "father" were presented such that 
the fixation point fell between the "t" and the "h," the pa- 
tients would say either "fat" or "her," depending on which 
hemisphere spoke first. Thus, in these patients two of the 
three major systems in human language can be managed 
to some extent by either hemisphere. It also illustrates 
an extraordinary plasticity, occurring sometimes over 10 
years after callosal surgery. 
Hemisphere Specialization 
One of the cardinal features of behavioral studies on the 
brain, both human and animal, has been the realization 
that specific brain areas seem to be involved with rather 
specific perceptual and cognitive functions. The split-brain 
approach to this issue has been straightforward. By testing 
each disconnected hemisphere, one can assess the differ- 
ent capacities each might possess. While some of the 
claims in this regard have become exaggerated, there are 
marked differences between the two half-brains (see Hel- 
lige, 1993). 
The Left Hemisphere Possesses a Unique Capacity 
to Interpret Behavior and Unconsciously Driven 
Emotional States 
A number of years ago we observed how the left, dominant 
speaking hemisphere dealt with the behaviors we knew 
we had elicited from the disconnected right hemisphere 
(Gazzaniga, 1995). We first revealed the phenomenon us- 
ing a simultaneous concept test. The patient is shown two 
pictures, one exclusively to the left hemisphere and one 
exclusively to the right, and is asked to choose from an 
array of pictures placed in full view in front of him the ones 
associated with the pictures lateralized to the left and right 
brain. In one example of this kind of test, a picture of a 
chicken claw was flashed to the left hemisphere, and a 
picture of a snow scene to the right hemisphere. Of the 
array of pictures placed in front of the subject, the obvi- 
ously correct association is a chicken for the chicken claw 
and a shovel for the snow scene. Case PS responded by 
choosing the shovel with the left hand and the chicken 
with the right. When asked why he chose these items, his 
left hemisphere replied, "Oh, that's simple. The chicken 
claw goes with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean 
out the chicken shed." Here, the left brain, observing the 
left hand's response, interprets that response into a con- 
text consistent with its sphere of knowledge, one that does 
not include information about the left hemifield snow 
scene. We called this left hemisphere process the "inter- 
preter." 
This same general idea has been observed when the 
left brain interpreter struggles to deal with mood shifts, 
produced in the experimental situation by manipulating 
the disconnected right hemisphere. A positive mood shift 
triggered by the right hemisphere finds the left interpreting 
its current experience in a positive way. Similarly, when 
the right triggers a negative mood state, the left interprets 
a previously neutral situation in negative terms. 
In recent studies we have been able to show one of the 
many implications for having a left hemisphere interpreter. 
It has long been known that inference and interpretation 
are important aspects of normal memory functioning (Bart- 
lett, 1932), and one would predict the two hemispheres 
might respond differently in some mnemonic tasks. Phelps 
and Gazzaniga (1992) showed that, when split-brain pa- 
tients were shown pictures representing a common scene, 
the two hemispheres responded differently when tested 
2 hr later. Their memory was tested with a lateralized yes- 
no recognition test in which the distracter pictures were 
either consistent or inconsistent with the original scene. 
The left hemisphere performed below chance on consis- 
tent distracter pictures, whereas the right hemisphere was 
above chance on these pictures and performed at the 
same level of accuracy as the pictures originally pre- 
sented. In short, the right hemisphere, which has no inter- 
pretive mechanism, rejected as seen before pictures that 
could have been part of the story. The left hemisphere, 
on the other hand, with its capacity for making inferences 
and interpretations, was more strongly influenced by the 
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expectations for actions common to a scene and falsely 
recognized pictures consistent with the observed scene. 
Similar results have recently been reported by Metcalfe 
et al. (1995). 
Monitoring and Production of Facial Expressions 
Are Managed by Different Hemispheres 
In the perceptual domain, it appears that the right hemi- 
sphere has special processes devoted to the efficient de- 
tection of upright faces (Gazzaniga, 1989). Although the 
left hemisphere can also perceive and recognize faces 
as well as reveal superior capacities when the faces are 
familiar, the right hemisphere appears specialized for un- 
familiar facial stimuli (Levy et al., 1972; Gazzaniga and 
Smylie, 1983). This pattern of asymmetry has also been 
shown for the rhesus monkey (Hamilton and Vermiere, 
1988). 
Since the right hemisphere is superior for perception of 
faces, it would be reasonable to suppose it is also special- 
ized for the management of facial expressions. Recent 
studies, however, have shown that, while both hemi- 
spheres can generate spontaneous facial expressions, 
only the dominant left hemisphere can generate voluntary 
facial expressions (Gazzaniga and Smylie, 1990). In these 
studies, single word commands such as "sm ile" or "frown" 
were given to either the left or right hemisphere. Mixed 
in with these commands that would require control of lower 
facial muscles would be other commands that called upon 
the upper facial muscles, such as "blow," "wink," and 
"blink." While both hemispheres were able to respond to 
the latter commands, only the left hemisphere could re- 
spond to the commands of "smile" and "frown." The right 
hemisphere responded at chance, thereby suggesting the 
left was specialized for the production of voluntary facial 
expressions. 
Hemisphere Specialization Sensorimotor Tasks 
There are some tests that bring out hemisphere superiori- 
ties in some of the patients. The block design test from 
the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale is one such test. 
Here, the simple task of arranging some red and white 
blocks to match those of a given pattern can find the left 
hemisphere performing poorly while the right triumphs 
(Bogen and Gazzaniga, 1965). However, in other patients 
both hemispheres when separated appear impaired, and 
in still others the left hemisphere, in addition to speaking 
and thinking, performs this task well. 
The same pattern of results as seen with the block de- 
sign test is also seen for other tests such as the nonsense 
wire figure test (Milner and Taylor, 1972). Yet, for both 
tests the prevalent picture would be that the skill frequently 
seems localized to the right hemisphere. When the capac- 
ity happens to be lateralized in this way, it should be easier 
to analyze than when the processes involved are shared 
between the two half-brains. The question is, what is it? 
The components of the block design task have not yet 
been identified. We do know that a patient who demon- 
strates a right hemisphere superiority for this kind of task 
can show no superiority on the perceptual aspects of the 
task. If a picture of the block design pattern is flashed to 
either hemisphere, each can easily find the match from 
a series of pictures. And, since each hand is demonstrably 
dexterous, the right for writing and the left for this kind of 
task, the crucial link must be in the mapping of the sensory 
message onto the capable motor system. It remains for 
future research to understand this superiority in perfor- 
mance when it is seen in one hemisphere. 
The Left Hemisphere Is Specialized 
for Intelligent Behavior 
Following disconnection of the human cerebral hemi- 
spheres, the verbal IQ of the patient remains intact (Nass 
and Gazzaniga, 1987; Zaidel, 1990), and the problem solv- 
ing capacity, such as seen in hypothesis formation tasks, 
remains unchanged for the left hemisphere (LeDoux et 
al., 1977a, 1977b). While there can be deficits in free recall 
capacity (i.e., to recall either verbally or visually previously 
learned items without he benefit of any cues or recognition 
aids) and in some other performance measures, the over- 
all capacity for problem solving seems unaffected. In other 
words, isolating essentially half of the cortex from the dom- 
inant left hemisphere causes no major change in cognitive 
functions. The left remains unchanged from its preopera- 
tive capacity, while the largely disconnected, same-size 
right hemisphere is seriously impoverished on a variety 
of cognitive tasks. While the largely isolated right hemi- 
sphere remains superior to the isolated left hemisphere 
for some activities, such as the recognition of upright 
faces--as well as other functions not covered in this re- 
view, such as some attentional skills (Mangun et al., 1994) 
and perhaps also emotional processes (Gainotti et al., 
1993)-it  is poor at problem solving and many other mental 
activities. A brain system (the right hemisphere) with 
roughly the same number of neurons as one that easily 
cogitates (the left hemisphere) is not capable of higher 
order cognition. This represents strong evidence that sim- 
ple cortical cell number by itself cannot fully explain human 
intelligence (Gazzaniga, 1994). 
Conclusions 
Over 30 years of split-brain research has provided exten- 
sive insights into the organization of the human brain. The 
surgical disconnection of the cerebral hemispheres pro- 
duces an extraordinary opportunity to study which percep- 
tual and cognitive processes are cortical in nature and 
which are subcortical. Visual perceptual information, for 
example, remains strictly lateralized to one hemisphere 
following callosal section. Tactile patterned information 
remains lateralized. Attentional mechanisms, however, 
can involve subcortical systems. Taken together, cortical 
disconnection produces two independent sensory infor- 
mation processing systems that call upon a common atten- 
tional resource system in the carrying out of perceptual 
tasks. 
Cortical disconnection also provides clues to the nature 
of human memory. Following posterior callosal surgery 
that involves sectioning the hippocampal commissure as 
well, split-brain patients retain normal recognition memory 
but are impaired on free recall tasks. This finding not only 
demonstrates that these two processes are dissociable, 
it also suggests that one role of the hippocampal commis- 
sures is to allow for the multiple representation of events 
that is known to be important in free recall memory. 
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Split-brain studies have also revealed the complex mo- 
saic of mental processes that go into human cognition. 
On the one hand, each cerebral hemisphere has its own 
set of specialized capacities. The left hemisphere, for ex- 
ample, is specialized for language and speech, and major 
problem solving capacities crucial for intelligent behavior. 
It also possesses a uniquely human capacity to interpret 
behavior and to construct theories about the relationships 
between perceived events and feelings. The right hemi- 
sphere, on the other hand, is specialized for specific tasks 
such as facial recognition, attentional monitoring, and pos- 
sibly other mental traits. It does not possess the overall 
cognitive capacities of the left brain, which finds it reacting 
more directly and simply to perceptual information. 
Finally, split-brain studies have demonstrated how spe- 
cific perceptual and cognitive skills can be isolated, 
through disconnection surgery, to particular cerebral ar- 
eas. These skills then are not revealed by their absence as 
a result of a cortical lesion, which in turn makes structure- 
function correlations difficult to make. The skills are pres- 
ent and can be demonstrated, but only when tested 
through either the left or right hemisphere. 
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